This paper studies the role of investment-specific shocks as an amplification mechanism of labor market fluctuations. We first show evidence suggesting that after a fall in the relative price of new equipment, not only do investment and output increase but firms also post more vacancies, hours worked increase and unemployment falls. Moreover, we study the quantitative impact of investment-specific shocks on the labor market by incorporating them in a Real Business Cycle model with search and matching frictions. We find that these shocks have a significant amplification effect on labor market fluctuations, increasing the volatility of unemployment, vacancies and total hours more than twofold.
IntroductionŔ
eal Business Cycle (RBC) theory stresses the role of neutral technological change as a major source of economic fluctuations. A problem with this framework is that the standard RBC model needs implausibly large and volatile neutral shocks to reproduce certain business cycle facts (see King and Rebelo, 1999 , for a discussion). Similarly, Shimer (2005) shows that the standard search and matching model cannot account for the observed cyclical fluctuations in relevant labor market variables such as vacancies and unemployment given shocks to labor productivity of reasonable magnitude. This suggests that there should be other important sources of aggregate fluctuation beyond standard productivity shocks.
A natural alternative to neutral technology shocks is investment-specific technological change. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) were the first researchers to study the quantitative implications for business cycle fluctuations of shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment. Their analysis indicates that these shocks may be an essential element of business cycles. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000) investigate the quantitative relevance of investment-specific technology shocks for postwar U.S. aggregate fluctuations, and find that it accounts for about 30 percent of output volatility.
In an empirical study, Fisher (2006) shows that when neutral and investmentspecific technology shocks are combined they account for 44 and 88 percent of the fluctuations in the U.S. output at business cycle frequencies before and after 1982, respectively. Similarly, both shocks account for 73 and 38 percent of the business cycle variation in hours. Fisher claims that investment-specific shocks are responsible for most of these effects. Canova, Lopez-Salido, and Michelacci (2007) and Ravn and Simonelli (2008) also find empirical evidence that this type of shock is important for business cycle fluctuations not only of output but also of labor market variables, such as vacancies, unemployment and hours worked.
This paper also provides empirical evidence from the postwar period in the U.S. showing a link between labor market outcomes and fluctuations in the relative price of new equipment, which is commonly associated in the literature with investment-specific technological change. The data suggest that when this price falls (relative to its downward trend), vacancies, employment and hours per worker increase in the short run. Moreover, other labor market variables such as unemployment and both the job finding and the job separation rates also seem to appropriately respond to shocks in the price of equipment.
These findings are the motivation for our quantitative analysis. We study the impact of investment-specific shocks on the labor market by incorporating them in an otherwise standard RBC model with labor search and matching frictions. We ´á lso consider the role of endogenous separations and capital utilization as propagation and amplification mechanisms of these shocks. Shapiro (1996) stresses the relevance of capital utilization for studying business cycles. Using the workweek of capital as a measure of utilization, his paper documents that this is an important margin of adjustment in many U.S. manufacturing industries over the business cycle. Furthermore, he finds that there is little or no cyclical movement in productivity once capital utilization is taken into account, and concludes that the RBC literature "needs to focus on the sources of shocks other than those to aggregate productivity" (p. 118). Shapiro (1986) argues that since capital utilization is essentially costless to adjust, it responds immediately to shocks. He finds that in response to shocks the workweek of capital tends to overshoot to compensate for the slow and costly adjustment of the capital stock. This, as we will show, is a crucial mechanism behind the response of labor market variables to investment-specific shocks.
Our main result is that investment-specific shocks have a significant impact on the volatility of labor market variables. The basic intuition is that a positive investment-specific shock has an expansionary effect on investment and capital utilization, which tends to increase marginal labor productivity and, in consequence, boosts hours and employment. Our quantitative results indicate that investmentspecific shocks help the model generate significant cyclical movements in unemployment, total hours and hours per worker, generating 66, 68 and 84 percent of their observed volatility in the U.S. economy. In contrast, our model without these shocks only accounts for 26, 31 and 52 percent of the cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, total hours and hours per worker. In general, labor market variables display larger fluctuations when the model incorporates investment-specific shocks. Va c a n c i e s and the job finding rate, however, still show relatively low cyclical variability. For instance, the model is only able to generate about 1/3 of the observed standard deviation of vacancies in the U.S. data.
Another relevant result is that endogenous separations amplify labor market fluctuations, especially in unemployment and job separations. Va c a n c i e s , however, become countercyclical and hence the model fails to reproduce the downwardsloping Beveridge curve.
Our work is related to Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) who study the effect of investment-specific technological change on labor market outcomes. In particular, they analyze the dynamic response to permanent shocks implied by a vintage capital growth model where technological progress can be investment-specific or investment-neutral. Moreover, the reallocation of workers is sluggish because of search frictions in the labor market. Our model, instead, assumes that technology shocks are transitory. In addition, unlike Michelacci and Lopez-Salido, we suppose that neutral technological change is entirely disembodied. Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2007) also consider a vintage capital model with search and matching frictions. They propose a simple extension of the standard search model and find that, for a calibrated version of their model with investment cost shocks, unemployment and labor-market tightness are more volatile than in the standard model.
More closely related to our paper are De Bock (2007) , and Faccini and Ortigueira (2009) who also study the implications of investment-specific technology shocks on a RBC model with search and matching frictions. Our model is somewhat similar to their models, especially to Faccini and Ortigueira's, but it differs in three dimensions: endogenous capital utilization, hours worked and job destruction. They consider, however, a version of their model with endogenous hours as well as exogenous shocks to the job separation rate.
While in De Bock (2007) investment-specific shocks do not generate amplification in labor market variables, in Faccini and Ortigueira (2009) these shocks generate significant cyclical fluctuations in the labor market. In their baseline model, investment-specific shocks alone account for 40 and 22 percent of the observed volatility of vacancies and unemployment as well as for 40 percent of labor productivity. Adding endogenous hours of work to their model has a small effect on their results. When they simulate their baseline economy with two technology shocks -neutral and investment-specific -and shocks to the job separation rate, the model generates 78 and 43 percent of the observed volatility of vacancies and unemployment. Instead, our baseline model with the two technology shocks reproduces 32 and 66 percent of those empirical values. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explores the cyclical behavior of relevant labor market variables and their relationship with fluctuations in the relative price of new equipment as a proxy for investment-specific technology shocks. Section 3 describes the model economy. In Section 4 we calibrate our model, and discuss the simulation results. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2 Relative price of investment and business cycle facts in the U.S. labor market
This section documents the cyclical behavior of the relative price of new equipment as well as its relation with relevant aggregate variables in the U.S. economy. In particular, we focus our analysis on labor market variables. First, we describe the data. Then, in Subsection 2.2, we document the properties of the series following the standard practice in the business-cycle literature. We also examine the causal relations between the relative price of investment and labor market variables. Finally, in Subsection 2.3, we look at the conditional correlations of VA R forecast errors at different horizons.
Data
The data on the relative price of new equipment, p e , comes from Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) . They use an annual series constructed by Cummins and Violante (2002) , and convert it into quarterly data as in Fisher (2006) from 1955 to 2000. Specifically, p e is the quality-adjusted price of new equipment divided by the Consumer Price Index. 1 In our empirical analysis, we also look at total output and investment, which we denote y and i. Output is the real gross domestic product, and investment is the real gross private domestic investment in equipment and software. Both are taken from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and seasonally adjusted by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Another variable in our analysis is the workweek of capital which we use as a proxy of capital utilization, h. Quarterly data on the workweek of capital comes from Orr (1989) , which is only available until 1984.
Among our labor market variables are vacancies and the unemployment rate. Va c a n c i e s , v, come from the seasonally adjusted help-wanted advertising index, constructed by the Conference Board. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, u, is measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Both variables are quarterly averages of monthly data.
The job finding rate, j, and separation rate, ρ, correspond to quarterly averages of monthly rates. These series are constructed by Robert Shimer from seasonally adjusted employment, unemployment, and mean unemployment duration, all computed by the BLS from the CPS. 2 Hours per worker, l, are measured as the total private average weekly hours of production workers. Total hours, nl, correspond to the index of aggregate weekly hours in the private sector, which are the product of average weekly hours, l, and non-supervisory worker employment, n. Both l and nl, as well as employment, n, are seasonally adjusted series constructed by the BLS from the Current Employment Statistics (CES). Hours worked are only available since 1964.
1 In a more recent study, Canova et al. (2007) show that the empirical results are not sensitive to the choice of deflator.
2 These two rates are calculated considering a two-state model (employed or unemployed) for workers.
For additional details, please see Shimer (2007) and his website http://robert.shimer.googlepages.com/flows.
Labor productivity, y/n, is the seasonally adjusted real average output per person in the non-farm business sector, constructed by the BLS from the NIPA and the CES. Finally, the wage, w, is the real hourly compensation index in the non-farm business sector also constructed by the BLS from NIPA and CES. Table 1 shows statistics describing the cyclical behavior of relevant variables related to the relative price of investment. It includes measures of cyclical volatility as well as correlations with p e at leads and lags of up to four quarters. We obtain the cyclical component of the series by applying the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, with smoothing parameter 1600, to data that have been logged. In this subsection, when we refer to a variable x, we are actually referring to its cyclical component as just defined.
Unconditional correlations and causality
There is a negative contemporaneous correlation of -0.436 between p e and y. Moreover, we found evidence that p e leads the cyclical behavior of y by about two quarters given that its correlation reaches a maximum (in absolute value) at that point. Moreover, p e is almost as volatile as y with a standard deviation of 0.016.
The evidence from the postwar period in the U.S. suggests an important link between the relative price of new equipment and investment at both low and high frequency as Greenwood et al. (2000) point out. We also find that there is negative co-movement between p e and i at business cycle frequency with a correlation of -0.444. Moreover, there is a negative correlation between p e and capital utilization with a maximum correlation of -0.440 when p e is leading by three quarters.
Looking at the relationship between p e and labor market variables, we observe a negative correlation with vacancies (-0.430) and employment (-0.474) , with p e slightly leading v by no more than a quarter at the most. As expected, p e and the unemployment rate are positively correlated (0.415). We also find a slightly positive contemporaneous correlation of 0.112 with the job separation rate, which lags about two to three quarters behind p e . Furthermore, the job finding rate is negatively correlated with p e (-0.418), and shows no lag or lead. Table 1 also shows a negative correlation with both hours per worker (-0.355) and total hours (-0.603). Moreover, there is evidence that p e leads both.
Finally, there is a negative correlation between labor productivity and p e , with a maximum correlation of -0.462 when p e leads by four quarters. We also observe, however, that the sign of these correlations switches from negative to positive. Similar changes in the sign of the correlation coefficients are observed with respect to l and ρ. Finally, we do not observe a significant correlation between p e and wages. In summary, these unconditional correlations seem to indicate that when new equipment becomes less expensive not only do investment and capital utilization increase but firms also post more vacancies and less jobs are destroyed. As a result, the job finding rate increases and unemployment falls. Moreover, hours per worker tend to increase which, together with the rise in employment, implies a boost in total hours. This increase in hours as well as in capital utilization has a positive impact on total output. This effect on output is big enough to make output per worker increase as well.
The evidence presented thus far does not tell us anything about the role of shocks in the relative price of new equipment as a driving force of the U.S. business cycle and, in particular, labor market fluctuations, which is the main goal of this paper. To that end we look at the causal relations between p e and our labor market variables. Thus, we perform a Granger causality test by estimating the following bivariate VA R with lag-length k: 3
where x 1t and x 2t are the cyclical component of p e and the respective other variable. 4 The first two columns of Table 2 show the p-values associated with the Fdistribution, indicating the probability of a false rejection of the null hypothesis (i.e., x it ∼ GC x jt , i = j). Thus, at the 5% significance level, p-values lower than 0.05 are indicative of Granger-causality. The Granger causality tests suggest that p e is connected with all the labor market variables except w. There is one-way causal linkage from the relative price of new equipment to employment, hours worked, unemployment, vacancies and the job finding probability, and one-way causal linkage from the job separation rate to 3 The optimal lag order is chosen by minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion. 4 In general, a variable x 1t is said to be "Granger causing" x 2t when a prediction of x 2t on the basis of its past history can be improved by further taking into account lags of x 1t . In other words, x 1t is not Granger causal for x 2t (i.e., x 1t ∼ GC x 2t ) if and only if α 21,i = 0, ∀ i = 1,2,...,k. p e . Finally, there is a bidirectional link between the relative price of investment and labor productivity.
In the standard matching and search model (Pissarides, 2000) , vacancies tend to immediately adjust to their new equilibrium when there is a shock to the economy. To discern whether vacancies respond immediately to investment specific shocks, we perform an instantaneous causality test (see Lutkepohl, 1991) . It is characterized by testing for non-zero correlation between the error vectors υ 1t and υ 2t . The null hypothesis, H 0 : E(υ 1t υ 2t ) = 0, is tested against the alternative of nonzero covariance between the two error vectors. A rejection of H 0 implies evidence in the direction of instantaneous causality (IC) between p e and x 2 , although the test is not able to identify the causal source. 5 The results shown in the last column of Table 2 suggest an instantaneous causality between p e and v. Hence, vacancies seem to adjust immediately in response to shocks to the relative price of investment.
Conditional correlations
One problem with focusing on unconditional correlations is that they are defined only for stationary variables. This involves rendering the data stationary through the HP filter, which in turn has potentially significant effects on the unconditional correlation coefficients (for more details, see Canova, 1998) . In addition, looking only at unconditional correlations implies some loss of information regarding the dynamics of the co-movement of variables.
To assess the robustness of last results, we employ a recently developed methodology suggested by den Haan (2000) . This new approach is based on vector autoregression methodology and does not require pre-filtering the data since it can accommodate both integrated and stationary variables. It yields a set of correlation coefficients of VA R forecast errors at different horizons. Basically, from a set of estimated bivariate VA R s between the relative price of investment and the rest of the labor market variables considered in Table 1 , we construct time series for the forecast errors using the difference between subsequent realizations and their forecasts. These time series are then used to generate covariance and correlation coefficients.
The series are again expressed in logs but are not filtered. The VA R s are estimated without imposing the unit-root restriction and considering linear and quadratic trends when necessary. The lag length in the VA R as well as the deterministic components were chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion. Table  3 displays the correlation coefficients for a forecast horizon of up to five years (J = 1,2,...,20), a period equivalent to the average duration of the U.S. business cycle during the 1854-2001 period. We also calculate bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000 replications to infer 95 percent confidence intervals. 6 We observe that the forecast error correlation coefficients are consistent with the unconditional correlations observed in Table 1 . The main result from this exercise is that, except for w, the sign of the correlation coefficients between p e and each of the labor market variables remain unchanged during the average duration of the cycle. This suggests a stable and significant relationship between the relative price of investment and these variables.
3 The model
The representative firm and the frictional labor market
We assume that there exists a competitive representative firm which uses labor services L and capital K to produce output Y with a constant-return-to-scale (CRS) production function e ζ t F(
where ζ t is an aggregate technology shock, h t denotes the rate of capital utilization, Φ t represents labor-augmenting technological change, and α ∈ (0,1). The stochastic variable ζ t follows a first-order autoregressive process of the form
with |ρ ζ | < 1, and ν ζt is i.i.d. N(0,σ ζ ). The productivity parameter Φ t is assumed to grow at a constant rate γ * φ , which implies that Φ t+1 = exp(γ * φ )Φ t . Because of CRS, we can write average output per efficiency unit of labor as
The representative firm owns the capital and therefore makes the capital accumulation decisions. Investment i t is subject to a random transformation rate ϒ t so that the firm accumulates i t ϒ t units of capital for next period. 7 We assume that ϒ t grows at a constant rate γ * υ along the balanced growth path, and follows a similar process as in Greenwood et al. (2000) , which is given by
where log ε υt follows an AR (2) log ε υt = ρ 1υ log ε υt−1 + ρ 2υ log ε υt−2 + ν υt ,
with |ρ 1υ + ρ 2υ | < 1 and ν υt is i.i.d. N(0,σ υ ). 8 Capital also depreciates each period. As in Greenwood et al. (2000) , the rate of depreciation depends on the capital utilization h, and takes the following functional form
with ω > 1, and ξ > 0. Thus, the law of motion for the capital stock is
At the beginning of period t, the firm has a large number of matched workers M t with which it could potentially establish (or continue) an employment relationship. Before production takes place, each matched worker draws an idiosyncratic labor-augmenting productivity level z from distribution Ω(z). We assume that z is i.i.d. across time and log-normally distributed LN(0,σ z ). After the z's are drawn, the firm breaks non-profitable matches. In particular, the firm chooses a thresholdz t such that matches with z <z t are severed. 9 Therefore, the firm's employment level each period is
Labor services L t not only depend on N t and the distribution of the productivity shock z but also on hours per worker l t . We assume that l t as well as wages w t are determined through individual bargaining between each worker and the firm and, in principle, are function of z. Thus, labor services are given by
w here˜Ω t (z)≡Ω(z|z≥z t ).
Our representative firm also posts job vacancies v t each period t. Each vacancy has a cost κΓ t , where κ is a constant and Γ t denotes output trend. 10 Moreover, each vacancy meets an unemployed worker with probability µ(u t ,¯v t )/¯v t , where µ(·,·) is a CRS matching function that depends on the unemployment rate¯u t and aggregate vacancies posted¯v t . In particular, we assume that
The CRS assumption on the matching function implies that the probability of the firm meeting an unemployed worker only depends on the labor market tightness θ t =¯v t /u t . Thus, we will let q(θ t ) = µ(u t ,¯v t )/¯v t . 11 Notice that the probability of a worker meeting a vacancy is µ(u t ,¯v t )/u t = θ t q(θ t ) and, therefore, the job finding probability is j(θ t , z t ) = θ t q(θ t ) 1− Ω(z t ) . At the end of each period, a fraction¯ρ of employed workers N will be terminated exogenously. Therefore, the firm will have
m atched workers next period. Thus, the probability that a match does not survive by next period (i.e., separation probability) is
(10) 9 We make sure that some necessary conditions are satisfied so thatz t exists. See Appendix. 10 This assumption is essential to guarantee that the model has balanced growth path. 11 An advantage of the functional form for the matching function (8), as pointed out by den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) , is that the matching probabilities are bounded between 0 and 1 as opposed to a Cobb-Douglas form. This facilitates the numerical solution of the model since truncations are not needed.
¯T he representative firm's problem is to choose how intensively to use its capital h t , the cutoff idiosyncratic productivity levelz t , next-period capital stock K t+1 , and how many job vacancies v t to post in order to maximize the value of the firm, given its current state (K t ,M t ) and the aggregate state of the economy (A t ,¯K t ,¯M t ,ζ t ,ϒ t ), where¯A t is aggregate households' wealth.
Strictly speaking, we assume that the economy has a perfect capital rental market, and that the representative firm also decides how much capital to use in its own production as well as how much capital to rent out to "other" firms at a given rental rate r t . In equilibrium, however, r t is such that the firm ends up using exactly its entire own capital stock. That is, for any given h t and L t ,
where F K denotes the partial derivative with respect to the first argument. For simplicity, we will formulate the firm's problem abstracting from this decision. 12 Note that, given that ϒ t and Φ t both have trend, the capital stock and output are non-stationary random variables. The Cobb-Douglas technology implies that output trend grows at rate γ * y = (1 − α)γ * φ + αγ * k , where γ * k = γ * υ + γ * y is the growth rate of the capital stock trend. As a result, the growth rate of capital and output along the balance growth path (BGP) are
Let us define output trend as well as Γ t+1 = exp(γ * y )Γ t . Similarly, let the trend of capital stock be Γ k,t+1 = exp(γ * k )Γ kt . We define the stationary counterpart of output, investment and capital asˆY t = Y t /Γ t ,î t = i t /Γ t andˆK t = K t /Γ kt . Now we can write
is a constant which we normalize to 1. Furthermore, the law of motion of capital (5) can be rewritten as
Since wages must grow at the same rate as output along the BGP, we define the detrended firm's wage bill as
12 An alternative, equivalent environment is one where firms do not own capital and rent it from households who make the investment decisions. Ñ otice that variables v t , N t , M t , l t ,z t , and h t are stationary variables. Therefore, they do not need to be detrended.
The firm's dynamic programming problem, in normalized form, can be written as follows (with no time subscripts), (6), (7), (8), (9), (13), (14), (16),
is the firm's state vector,¯s = (ˆA,ˆK,¯M,ζ,ε υ ) is the aggregate state vector, Q(¯s) is the current price of next-period consumption, Θ(¯s) represents the aggregate policy rule for θ, and G s is the aggregate law of motion for¯s. 13 We assume that the firm simultaneously bargains with its workers and chooses {h, z,ˆK ,v}.
The solution of the firm's dynamic programming problem yields optimal policy rules g h (s f ,¯s) = h, g z (s f ,¯s) =z, g k (s f ,¯s) =ˆK , and g v (s f ,¯s) = v.
We can obtain these policy rules by solving the system of equations formed by the following first-order optimality conditions,
h :
. (23) Condition (18) governs the accumulation of capital, equation (19) is the job creation condition, expression (20) determines the rate of capital utilization, and ˆ˜˜ẽ quation (21) is the job destruction condition. By substituting (19) into (21) and using the Cobb-Douglas production function assumption, we can rewrite the job destruction condition as
wherek =ˆK/L. The right hand side of equation (24) describes the losses of terminating such a worker net of its indirect impact on the individual wage-hours bargaining. Alternatively, it represents the marginal value of that worker. The first term on the right corresponds to lost output whereas the second term constitutes the expected loss for not having this marginal worker next period. The third term reflects the change in the wage bill and total output as a result of the impact on the wage-hours negotiations of laying off that marginal worker, which will become clear below. The firm terminates matches up to the point when is no longer profitable doing so. That is, when the worker's wage and her marginal value are equal. 14 An useful result from the firm's problem is that the optimal amount of effective capital per efficiency unit of labor (kh) depends only on the aggregate statē s. By substituting the optimality condition (11) on the BGP [i.e., r = ε υ e ζ h f (kh)] into equation (20), we obtain hδ (h) = r.
This implies that h only depends on r, which in turn is only a function of the aggregate state¯s. Hence, from (11), we conclude that so doesk.
Households
The economy is populated by a large number I of workers-consumers. Each worker may be either employed or searching for a job. Employed workers earn a wage w and work l hours. As in Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996), we assume that there exists a perfect insurance market, and that all agents are ex-ante identical before employment status are revealed at the beginning of the initial period. Therefore there is a representative household who owns stock in the firm of value A (its wealth), and has a fraction m members matched to firms at the beginning of the current period. Its problem is to choose current per capita consumption c and per capita next-period wealth a to maximize its lifetime utility.
We assume that each household member has instantaneous CES utility over consumption and leisure. We also assume that there is a fixed disutility b of working regardless of the number of hours worked. This can also be interpreted as the utility value of being unemployed. Thus, the instantaneous utility function takes the following form
here I {l>0} is an indicator function equal to 1 if the worker is employed (i.e. l > 0). Formally, the (normalized) household's problem can be expressed recursively as follows
here s h = (a,m) is the household's state vector, β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, Z(¯s) is the aggregate policy rule for the cutoff productivityz, andˆa = a/Γ and c = c/Γ are the detrended counterparts of wealth and consumption. The solution to this problem yields policy rules g c (s f ,¯s) =ˆc and g a (s f ,¯s) =ˆa .
The optimality conditions of the representative consumer's problem are
a :
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the consumer's budget constraint, and V a (s h ,¯s ) = λ .
Thus, we obtain that the current price of tomorrow's consumption satisfies
3
.3 Wage-hours bargaining
Wages and hours are determined through Nash bargaining between the firm and each individual worker where they split the total surplus generated by that specific employment relationship. That implies that each worker is effectively the marginal worker, whose productivity depends on N. Thus, the relevant surplus depends on the marginal value of a job. 15 Since each particular job is matched with a particular worker, its marginal value depends on the match-specific productivity z i ≥z. Thus, in normalized form, it is equal to
This expression deserves some discussion. The first term on the right hand side of the equation represents worker i's marginal productivity. The second term subtracts worker i's wage. Moreover, the firm takes into account the effect of adding (or keeping) worker i on the wage and hours bargained with the other workers. Those effects are represented by the third and fourth terms. The last term denotes the discounted expected value of the worker in the future, which is given by nextperiod marginal value of a match Π M (s ,¯s ). Notice then that the following condition holds
This simply says that the value of a match (before z is drawn) has to be equal to the expected value of a job weighted by 1− Ω(z) .Ñotice that Ω(z)M workers have zero value for the firm. It is straightforward to check that equation (30) satisfies this condition. The (net) value of being employed is described by the following equation
where λ is equal to the marginal utility of consumption as shown above, and V M denotes the household's marginal value of having a worker matched with a firm next period. Similarly to the value of a job, it follows that V m (s h ,¯s)
The Nash bargaining solution is a wage rate w i and hours l i that solve
where η represents the worker's bargaining power. This yields the following wage schedule and hours:
The resulting hours (36) imply that the marginal product of labor equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. In other words, the firm and workers seek to maximize the total surplus of each match when choosing hours. Wages are then determined according to the Nash rule.
The differential equation for the wage (35) can be simplified as follows. First notice that hours worked do not depend on N because, as we showed above, k and h do not depend on the firm's employment level, and λ andˆc do not either. Thus,
Now we rewrite (35) aŝ
Notice that Ψ(z i ,¯s) does not depend on N. Therefore, the wage does not depend on N either, and
Accordingly, the wage function simplifies as
with s = (s f ,s h ).
Equilibrium
Definition 1 A recursive equilibrium in this stationary economy is a set of functions for:
• Prices: Q(¯s),ˆw(s,¯s,z), r(¯s);
• Quantities: g k (s,¯s), g z (s,¯s), g h (s,¯s), g v (s,¯s), g c (a,¯s), g a (a,¯s), l(s,¯s,z), G A (¯s), G K (¯s),G M (¯s), Θ(¯s), Z(¯s); • Va l u e s : Π(s f ,¯s), V(s h ,¯s), W J (s f ,¯s,z), W E (s h ,¯s,z); such that:
i. V(s h ,¯s) solve the representative consumer's problem (25) with associated policy functions g c (s h ,¯s), g a (s h ,¯s); ii. Π(s f ,¯s) solves the firm's problem (17) with associated policy functions g k (s f ,¯s), g z (s f ,¯s), g h (s f ,¯s), g v (s f ,¯s); iii. the wage scheduleˆw(s,¯s,z) and hours l(s,¯s,z) solve the individual Nash bargaining problem (34) for z≥z; iv. the interest rate r(¯s) clears the capital market; v. Q(¯s) clears the asset market; and vi. the following consistency conditions hold: G A (¯s) = I × g a (¯s,¯s), G K (¯s) = g k (¯s,¯s), G M (¯s) =¯M(1 − Ω(g z (¯s,¯s)))(1 −¯ρ) + q(θ)g v (¯s,¯s), (Π(¯s,¯s) ,¯s).
Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model at quarterly frequency to be consistent with some empirical facts for the U.S. economy in the postwar period. In particular, our parameterization must match eight steady-state targets. From the RBC literature we take three standard statistics. A capital's share of output of about one third, consistent with the NIPA; a quarterly interest rate of about 1 percent; and a depreciation rate of 2.5 percent per quarter. We also target an average annual growth rate of GDP per capita of 1.91 percent. This corresponds to the annual average growth rate of the Real Gross Domestic Product divided by the civilian non-institutional population. The GDP is taken from the NIPA while civilian population is taken from the BLS.
The remaining four targets are related to labor market outcomes. First, we set an average unemployment rate u * of 11 percent. This figure is consistent with the fraction of unmatched workers in the U.S. when we consider not only the officially unemployed but also those not in the labor force who "want a job". Using the CPS from 1968 to 1986, Blanchard and Diamond (1990) find that on average there are 11.2 million people either unemployed (6.5) or not in the labor force who want a job (4.7) out of a total of 104.4 million workers (93.2 millions employed). 16 Secondly, we target a steady-state job separation probability ρ * equal to 0.1 per quarter. 17 This value is commonly used in the literature (see Shimer, 2005 , den Haan et al., 2000 , and is consistent with available empirical estimates. Hall (1995) concludes that the average quarterly separation rate in the U.S. is between 8 and 10 percent. Moreover, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) 16 Other studies of labor market dynamics also use Blanchard and Diamond's (1990) figures to calibrate their models. For instance, den Haan et al. (2000) target a steady-sate ratio of unmatched to matched workers of 0.12. In Ya s h iv (2006), the average unemployment rate is set at 10.4. His computed unemployment rate is highly correlated with the official rate (0.98).
17 Starred variables denote their steady-state levels.
use CPS data and find an annual separation rate of 36.8 percent, which is roughly equivalent to our quarterly target. We also target an elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment ε * µ of 0.5 as in Pissarides (2009) . This value is consistent with empirical evidence reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) , who argue in their survey paper that a "plausible range for the empirical elasticity on unemployment is 0.5 to 0.7" (p. 393). For comparative purposes, in an alternative parameterization we target a matching elasticity of 0.72. Shimer (2005) finds this elasticity when estimating the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas matching function for the U.S. using data on the job finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio.
Our final target is a Frisch labor supply elasticity of one third as in Bils, Chang, and Kim (2009) . They point out that much of the evidence suggests a value of 0.5 or below.
We need to find values the following parameters: β, σ, ψ, b (preferences), α (technology), ω, ξ (depreciation), ϕ (matching function),¯ρ (exogenous job separation), κ (vacancy cost), η (workers bargaining power). We also must select values for the long-run growth rates γ * y and γ * υ as well as for parameters ρ ζ , σ ζ , ρ 1υ , ρ 2υ , and σ υ , which govern the stochastic processes for random variables ζ and log ε υ . Finally, we need to set the standard deviation of log z, σ z . Tables 4 displays the baseline parameter values. The long-run growth of output γ * y is set to 0.0047 to match the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita.
We take the parameters of the stochastic process ζ from Hansen and Wright (1992) , and set ρ ζ = 0.95 and σ ζ = 0.007. As for the investment-specific technol-ogy process, we estimate equations (2) and (3) using our quarterly sample for the real price of equipment. We obtain γ * υ = 0.011, ρ 1υ = 1.6994, ρ 2υ = −0.7075 and σ υ = 0.006. 18 The elasticity of output with respect to capital α is set equal to 1/3, coinciding with the average capital's share of output mentioned above. It is important to notice that in this setting, where wages are not equal to the marginal productivity of labor, (1 − α) does not necessarily coincide with the labor's share of output.
The coefficient of relative risk aversion σ is chosen to be 2. We also set ψ = 0.727 to match our target of 1/3 for the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
We pin down the subjective discount factor β by using the fact that the (gross) interest rate R must satisfy the steady-state equilibrium condition 1/R * = βe γ * y (ψ(1−σ)−1) . This expression comes from equation (29) given Q = 1/R in equilibrium. For an average quarterly interest rate of 1 percent, we obtain β = 0.998.
Using equations (18), (20) and (22), we derive the steady-state condition for capital utilization
Notice that h * and consequently δ(h * ) only depend on ω and ξ given Q * . We normalize h * = 1, and choose ω = 1.847 and ξ = 0.046 such that δ(h * ) = 0.025, consistent with our target for the average depreciation rate. The standard deviation of random variable log(z) is set to σ z = 0.2. According to Zanetti (2007) , the literature provides a range of values between 0.1 and 0.4 for the standard deviation of the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks. We choose an intermediate value.
Regarding the exogenous separation probability¯ρ, we choose two values. For our baseline value, following den Haan et al. (2000) , we interpret exogenous separations as worker-initiated separations. Hence, endogenous separations are associated with the layoff rate. This is consistent with our model because endogenous separation decisions are made by the firm. According to the evidence from JOLTS shown by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006) and from the Census' Survey of Income and Program Participation shown by Nagypal (2008) , layoffs represent on average about 35 percent of total separations. Thus, one of the values we pick for ρ is 0.065, which is close to the one used by den Haan et al. (2000) . They set this parameter to 0.068 using a slightly different calibration strategy. We consider this exogenous probability to be an upper bound because most of the quits are in fact job-related quits, which can hardly be classified as exogenous (see Nagypal, 2008, for details). Therefore, we also consider¯ρ = 0.035. Table 5 displays the values for alternative calibrations. We select the matching technology parameter ϕ in order to match our target for ε * µ . Since the matching elasticity depends on θ as well, we need to solve the following system of equation for ϕ and θ * ,
The first equation is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment in the steady state. The second expression comes from the law of motion for employment given by equations (6) and (9). The left-hand side represents employment-to-unemployment transitions whereas the right-hand side determines unemployment-to-employment transitions. In the steady state they must be equal so that the unemployment rate remains constant. Notice that the steady-state job finding probability j(θ * , z * ) = 1− Ω(z * ) θ * q(θ * ) must be equal to ρ * (1 − u * )/u * = 0.81. For our baseline parameterization (i.e.,¯ρ = 0.065 and ε * µ = 0.5), we obtain ϕ = 3.991.
According to the Hosios (1990) condition for efficiency, we internalize the search externality in the model by setting the bargaining power parameter η equal to our target elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment, η = ε * µ . It is somewhat common in the search-and-matching literature to calibrate the bargaining power parameter by assuming the condition for efficiency (see, for example, Pissarides, 2009 , Shimer, 2005 .
Parameters κ and b are chosen so that the first-order conditions (19) and (21) are satisfied in the steady state. Thus, we set κ = 0.172 and b = 0.407. To put the value of κ in perspective, we calculate the total vacancy cost e γ * y κv * in the steady state, and find that it represents about 1 percent of total output.
As for our calibrated value of b, which includes home production, leisure activities and unemployment benefits, it implies that the opportunity cost of employment represents about 45 percent of the average wage, and nearly 30 percent of output per worker in the steady state.
Simulation results
In this subsection we assess the quantitative importance of investment-specific shocks for cyclical fluctuations in the labor market. We do so by comparing the simulation results of our baseline economy with those of an otherwise identical economy without i-shocks (i.e., σ υ = 0).
We perform Monte Carlo simulations with 5000 realizations. In each iteration, we let the economy run for 1184 periods and only take the simulated data of the last 184 periods (the same number of quarters for the data on the relative price of investment p e ). We then add the corresponding non-stationary component back onto our simulated data, which is also logged and HP-filtered in the same way as we do with the U.S. data before calculating the statistics of interest. Finally, we compute the average of these simulated statistics over the 5000 realizations. Tables  6 and 7 show the results.
In order to perform the simulations, we first solve the stationarized version of the model using a first-order log-linearization procedure implemented in Dynare for Matlab. 19 The main result is that investment-specific shocks play a role in amplifying labor market fluctuations. This can be seen by comparing columns 2 and 5 in the upper panel of Table 6 . When i-shocks are operative, the job separation rate is 2.83 times more volatile which mainly explains the 2.51 times increase in unemployment volatility. Va c a n c i e s also become quite more volatile, with a standard deviation that is 3.57 larger. The volatility of the job finding rate also increases but only 1.81 times. This implies that the job destruction margin is much more sensitive to shocks to the relative price of investment.
Moreover, the standard deviations of employment and hours per worker are 2.5 and 1.6 times larger which indicates that the extensive margin is relatively more sensitive to i-shocks.
The baseline model generates 66, 84 and 92 percent of the observed standard deviations of unemployment, hours per worker and employment, respectively. The model, however, falls relatively short in reproducing the volatility of vacancies and the job finding rate, with standard deviations that are 32 and 46 percent as large as in the data. In contrast, the job separation rate and wages are more volatile than in the data. Investment-specific shocks also play a role in amplifying the labor market volatility relative to fluctuations in output (see lower panel of Table 6 ). When we shut down i-shocks, unemployment and vacancies are 1.95 and 0.81 times as volatile as output. Instead, in our baseline calibration, unemployment and vacancies are 4.02 and 2.36 times more volatile than output. With the exception of wages, the relative volatility of labor market variables is smaller than that observed in the data. For instance, unemployment and vacancies fluctuate about 4 and 2.4 times more than output in our model, compared to about 7.1 and 8.6 in the data.
Investment-specific shocks also amplify the volatility of the remaining variables. When i-shocks are operative, the standard deviation of output is 18 percent larger than when we shut down these shocks. Furthermore, the volatility of investment and capital utilization are significantly larger, increasing from 3.77 and 0.78 with σ υ = 0 to 5.63 and 1.77 in the baseline parameterization. This is expected since i-shocks directly affects the optimal conditions (18) and (20) governing capital accumulation and utilization.
Consumption also becomes more volatile when i-shocks are operative. The increase of the standard deviation of both consumption and investment are closely related. After a positive i-shock, for instance, agents substitute investment away from consumption. This mechanism also explains the fall in the correlation between consumption and output from 0.98 to 0.48 when i-shocks are present (see upper panel of Table 7 ).
The intuition behind the amplifying effect of i-shocks on labor market fluctuations can be described as follows. A positive shock reduces the user cost of capital which stimulates investment and capital utilization. The resulting increase in total capital services Kh boosts labor productivity, which has a positive impact on hours and employment. To better illustrate this mechanism, Figure 1 shows the impulse-responses to a favorable i-shock. The fall in the relative price of investment yields an immediate increase in capital utilization since it is virtually costless to adjust. One quarter after the shock, investment and hours per worker increase, and job destruction declines. Moreover, firms also open more vacancies during the initial periods. As a result, unemployment falls and the job finding rate increases. Because of the persistent nature of i-shocks, investment and the utilization rate remain above their initial levels until convergence, which has a lasting effect on labor market variables.
The relevance of capital utilization as a transmission channel of shocks can be assessed by shutting down this margin (columns 6). As observed in the upper panel of Table 6 , the standard deviations of all of the variables fall compared with our baseline economy. In particular, the standard deviations of unemployment and vacancies decrease from 7.28 and 4.28 in the baseline model to 4.88 and 3.14 in the model without capital utilization. Hence, variable capital utilization provides the model with an amplification mechanism to shocks. When we look at the relative volatilities in the lower panel of the table, however, the amplification effect of capital utilization goes, in most cases, in the opposite direction. This indicates that capital utilization has a stronger amplification over output than over most of the other variables, especially labor market variables. This is a somewhat intuitive result because the capital utilization margin works as a substitute for both hours and employment.
Results from our baseline calibrated model reveal one important counterfactual prediction regarding the labor market. Namely, that the contemporaneous correlation of vacancies with output is negative in the model (-0.20) , whereas the empirical evidence says that it is strongly procyclical for the U.S. economy. As a consequence, we obtain a significant positive correlation of 0.60 between vacancies and unemployment in contrast to -0.92 in the data. Thus, the baseline model is unable to reproduce the so-called Beveridge curve.
The baseline model predicts this counterfactual correlation of vacancies and unemployment mainly because of the large fraction of endogenous job destruction. As pointed out by Krause and Lubik (2007) , when the exogenous separation probability increases and gets closer to the steady-state separation rate, the model delivers a lower correlation between vacancies and unemployment. Indeed, when we set¯ρ = 0.10 and, consequently, there is no endogenous job destruction in the steady state, we obtain a correlation of −0.55. 20 We also observe that vacancies become strongly procyclical with a correlation with output of 0.75 (see column 7 in Table 7 ). Another example comes from our parameterization B (column 3). With a lower¯ρ = 0.035, instead, the model produces an even more countercyclical behavior of vacancies and, in consequence, a more positive vacancies-unemployment correlation.
Also notice that endogenous job destruction significantly amplifies labor market fluctuations. For example, with¯ρ = 0.035, the standard deviations of va-cancies and unemployment are 6.48 and 10.1, about 50 and 40 percent larger than in the baseline parameterization.
As we mentioned in Section 4, the unemployment-elasticity of the matching function used in the literature varies considerably (see Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008 , for a discussion). Different values for this elasticity affect the quantitative results in different directions. For instance, when we increase ε * µ from 0.5 in our baseline parameterization to 0.72 in parameterization C, the standard deviations of job separations and unemployment increase, while the standard deviation of the job finding rate falls (see column 4 of the upper panel of Table 6 ).
Finally, the lower panel of Table 7 shows that most of the variables in the baseline economy display somewhat similar persistence to that observed in the data. One exception is vacancies, which exhibit an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.55 in the baseline parameterization compared with 0.9 in the data. Notice, however, that i-shocks have a substantial propagation effect on vacancies as their persistence is nearly zero when we shut down these shocks. In general, all labor market variables become more persistent when the model i-shocks are operative.
Conclusions
In this paper we provide evidence from the postwar period in the U.S. that shows a link between the relative price of new equipment and labor market variables. We find that when the price of equipment falls relative to its trend, vacancies, employment, hours per worker and the job finding rate increase in the short run. We also observe that unemployment and the job separation rate move together with the relative price of equipment.
We present a quantitative model in which investment-specific shocks have a significant impact on labor market variables. In particular, the volatility of labor market variables increases with the variance of the investment-specific shock. Our baseline model reproduces 66 and 68 percent of the observed cyclical fluctuations in unemployment and total hours. Moreover, it accounts for 92 and 84 percent of the observed standard deviations of employment and hours per worker. The model, however, generates only 32 and 46 percent of the observed volatility of vacancies and the job finding rate.
Another important result is that having endogenous separations in the model introduces a significant amplification effect. We find that more endogenous job destruction leads to an increase in the cyclical fluctuations of both vacancies and, especially, unemployment. The problem with this adjustment margin is that the model tends to deliver counterfactual predictions regarding the behavior of vacan-cies and unemployment. In particular, it fails to reproduce the observed negative relationship between vacancies and unemployment (i.e., the Beveridge curve).
Our simulation results also show that capital utilization provides an amplification mechanism to shocks. This amplification effect seems to be larger on output than on labor market variables. This result arises because the capital utilization margin works as a substitute for labor services.
where Φ(·) is the standard Normal c.d.f. The first four equations are optimal conditions for capital accumulation, job creation, capital utilization and job destruction, respectively. The auxiliary variable k h denotes "effective" capital and is only introduced to shorten other equations in this appendix (in our numerical solution we do not solve for this variable). Equation (A9) is equal to ˜∞ z zl(·,z)dΩ(z|z >z) in equation (23). Expression (A10) is the conditional expectation of z given z >z t . It follows from the properties of the log-normal distribution. Similarly, equation 
is an auxiliary variable representing the term ˜∞ z (1 − l(·,z)) (1−ψ)(1−σ) dΩ(z|z >z) in equation (26). We obtain equation (A15) Then, we raise both sides of this equality to (1 − ψ)(1 − σ) and take conditional expectation with respect to z.
Let us define three other variables that show up in the firm's optimal conditions and need to be solve for: the average wage¯w t , the minimun/marginal wage˜w t , and the marginal hoursl t . After manipulating the hours worked and wage equations (36) and (37), we get 
Another key equation is the law of motion for employment N t . We define it below together with the separation probability ρ t , the unemployment rate U t , the job finding probability j t , the labor market tightness θ t , and the job matching probability q t , as follows
ρ t =Ω t (1 −¯ρ) +¯ρ, (A20) U t = 1 − N t , (A21) j t = (1 −Ω t )θ t q t ,
We now define the resources constraint of the economy which must be satisfied in equilibrium as well as other aggregate variables such as total output Y t , investment I t , output per worker y t , and total hours H t : is an auxiliary variable representing the conditional mean of z 1 ψσ−ψ−σ . Finally, the stochastic processes for ζ t , and ε υt , ζ t+1 = ρ ζ ζ t + ν ζt+1 , (A32) log ε υ,t+1 = ρ 1υ log ε υt + ρ 2υ log ε υt−1 + ν υt+1 ,
where the innovations ν ζt and ν υt are Normal iid as described in the model section.
A.2 Steady state equations
From the previous equations we can derive the non-stochastic steady state of the economy, which we use to calibrate the model. Recall that we normalize h * = 1 by appropriately choosing parameters ω and ξ (for more details, see the calibration section). -Firm's and consumer's optimality conditions: 
λ * = ψC * ψ(1−σ)−1 (N * ¯x * +U * ).
-Unemployment and other related variables:
A.3 Existence of the productivity thresholdz
We claim that all matches with z <z are inefficient (i.e., non-profitable) and, therefore, destroyed. Here we provide an heuristic proof of that claim. First, let us write the right hand side of the job destruction equation (24) as a function of z. That is, RHS(z) = (1 − α)e ζ f (kh)zl(z) + κ(1 −¯ρ) q(θ) .
Recall that the last term of (24) is zero. Similarly, the LHS of the job destruction condition as a function of z is simply the wage equation (37), which we reproduce below (with somewhat simplified notation)
It should be clear that if RHS(z) < w(z), then the marginal value for the firm of a match with productivity z is lower than its marginal cost (i.e., the wage), in which case the match in not profitable. That is, the firm is better off laying off that worker and opening a vacancy at cost e γ y κ. Notice that the second term of RHS(z) takes into account the future expected value of not laying off a worker. Thus, a necessary condition for a thresholdz to exist is that for sufficiently small values of z, the inequality RHS(z) < w(z) is satisfied. Let us take the limit of RHS(z) and w(z) as z → 0, which we denote RHS 0 and w 0 , respectively. We obtain the following expressions:
Given that we do not have a closed-form solution of the equilibrium allocation and, in particular, for θ and λ, as a function of the state variables (as well as primitives), it is not possible to demonstrate that RHS 0 < w 0 for all states. We do make sure, however, that this condition is satisfied both in the steady state and in the numerical solution of the dynamic model. Another necessary condition for equation (24) to have a solution is that for sufficiently large z, RHS(z) > w(z). We prove that as follow. It is sufficient to
